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IMPACT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
Ross C. TISDALE
Examination of any standard case book on contracts re-
veals the fact that many cases treating with offer and
acceptance are sales cases. They seem to illustrate more
effectively than other contract cases the principles of law
applicable to offer and acceptance, rejection and counter-
offer, price terms, output and requirements agreements and
other problems with which the first year law student strug-
gles. This is not surprising because a substantial percentage
of sales cases come into court as contract problems. What is
surprising is that a distinct body of contract law designed to
cope with mercantile problems apparently did not develop in
the area of formation of contracts. Certainly it has become
evident that the standard rules relating to matters mentioned
above have not kept pace with what merchants actually do or
wish to do in dealing with one another.
The need for departure from standard contract principles
is illustrated by the special rules in the Code relating to
merchants.1 Thirteen sections of the U. C. C. relate to trans-
actions between merchants, or against merchants, which may
not apply to inexperienced persons not primarily engaged in
commerce.
2
One should not assume that this treatment of the merchant
as a professional is new. Our existing Sales Act has less
specific provisions which relate to dealers in a particular
kind of goods, 3 and which permit evidence of course of dealing
and custom to negate implied obligations which ordinarily
* B.S.C., University of North Dakota; LL.B., University of North Da-
kota School of Law; Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School
of Law.
1. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1958
Official Text with Comments. Reference will frequently be in abbreviated
form: "U.C.C.", or simply to the "Code".
Since July 1962 the "Code" has been republished by the Edward
Thompson Company, Brooklyn, N. Y., as a part of the Uniform Laws An-
notated. The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., Rochester N. Y., of-
fers Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code. See attached sheet.
2. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207, 2-209, 2-314, 2-402(2), 2-403(2),
2-103(b), 2-327(1)(c), 2-603, 2-605, 2-509, and 2-609.
3. Uniform Sales Act § 15(2), N.D. CVent Code § 51-01-17(3) (1961);
Uniform Sales Act § 16(3), N.D. Cent. Code § 51-01-17(3) (1961).
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arise in a sale of goods.4 The more specific provisions of the
U. C. C., however, recognize the fact that merchants are pro-
fessionals who must be held to standards of conduct that may
differ from those applicable to a layman, and that merchants
may have specialized business needs that do not always fit
within the limits of rules governing ordinary contracts.
Before taking up the specific sections relating to contracts
it should be noted that the Code imposes an obligation of good
faith in the performance or enforcement of every contract
or duty falling within its provisionsA Since the Code is
elastic, recognizing the need for flexibility to enable the law
to grow with the needs of commerce, this concept of good
faith is of vital importance. It forestalls any contention that
the code is a blank check issued to merchants.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss those sections of
the U. C. C. which will modify existing rules governing for-
mation, construction and performance of contracts; to de-
termine why the changes were made, their wisdom, and
whether they should extend beyond the area of sales.
THE OFFER
Orderly presentation suggests the offer as a beginning
topic of discussion. As students we learned that an offer
must be definite. It could be in skeleton form, and in the case
of an order for goods, frequently is. But in any event it
must spell out the essential parts of the proposed deal. True,
if no time of performance was agreed upon the law assumed
performance to be due in a reasonable time., If no price was
set, under certain circumstances, the law would permit filling
the blank 7 -but one could not push his luck too far on terms.
The court would not write a contract for the parties.8 The
U. C. C. accepts these ideas in principle, but with reservations
to be developed later in this paper.
4. Uniform Sales Act § 71, N.D. Cent. Code § 51-01-72 (1961).
5. U.C.C. § 1-203: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C.
§ 2-103(b): "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing in the trade."
6. Gunderson v. Burbidge, 75 N.W.2d 757 (N.D. 1956); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 9-07-22 (1961).
7. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 574 (3d ed., Jaeger, 1957); 1 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 101 (1950).




It is also accepted law that an offer not supported by a con-
sideration is revocable at any time prior to acceptance by
the offeree9 Probably this remains true although the seller
furnished his salesmen with order blanks containing a state-
ment that the order should be irrevocable when signed by
the offerer (buyer), although it was not to become binding
on the offeree until accepted at the home office. 10 Our feel-
ing here is that an attempt has been made to bluff the offeror
into believing that his legal right to revoke is gone. It
smacks of trickery in the case of the consumer.
But what of the case where two merchants are negotiat-
ing? S wishes to induce B to purchase goods. He feels that
B will accept an offer if given time to consider. S, therefore,
gives him a "firm offer" for 5 day consideration. In other
words, S agrees that the offer shall be irrevocable for that
length of time. Do the same arguments apply in the last
case as in the first case stated?
True, the offeror in the first case can earnestly contend
that he had no fradulent intent. Sound commercial reasons
exist for making offers obtained by salesmen irrevocable
until they can be processed at the home office. But since a
selling job preceded the signing of an offer blank prepared
by the offeree, one may rightfully suspect that this is one
point never discussed by the parties. One may further sus-
pect that offerees seldom study order blanks other than to
assure themselves as to the accuracy of the description, quan-
tity, price and shipment terms. If fraud is not involved, in
many cases surprise may be present. One might ask further
whether it is ethical to include in a contract form terms which
he knows to be unenforceable and which in fact may mislead
the other party?
Where the offeror submits the offer on his own form and
9. N.D. Cent. Code § 9-03-22 (1961); Reeves & Co. v. Bruening, 13 N.D.
157, 100 N.W. 241 (1904).
The Code has been adopted in the following states, the effective
date being indicated in each case: Alaska-Jan. 1, 1963; Arkansas-Jan. 1,
1962; Connecticut-Oct. 1, 1961; Georgia-April 1, 1963; Illinois-July 1,
1962; Kentucky-July 1, 1960; Massachusetts-Oct. 1, 1958; Michigan-Jan.
1, 1964; New Hampshire-July 1, 1961; New Jersey- Jan. 1, 1963; New
Mexico-Jan. 1, 1962; New York-Sept. 27, 1964; Ohio-July 1, 1962; Okla-
homa- Dec. 31, 1962--Oregon-Sept. 1, 1963; Pennsylvania-July 1, 1954;
Rhode Island-Jan. 2, 1962; Tennessee (effective date unavailable);
Wyoming -Jan. 1, 1962.
10. Challenge Feed & Feed Mill Co. v. Kerr, 93 Mich. 328, 53 N.W. 555
(1892).
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states that the offer shall be irrevocable no element of either
fraud or surprise is invojved. The offeror is seeking to bind
only himself. He is conferring a gratuitous privilege on the
offeree of considering this offer for a definite period of
time without fear that it will be snatched from him.
Here, if overreaching or fraud is involved, the shoe is on
the other foot. The offeree has been encouraged to delay ac-
ceptance on the faith of the offeror's promise not to revoke.
If he can show facts sufficient to invoke promissory estoppel,
the promise is enforceable." Otherwise, as a common law
proposition, only a moral obligation rests on the offeror not
to revoke his promise. Recognition of the fact that merchants
do want to make firm offers and do consider themselves
bound thereby may be found in legislation of two leading
commercial states, 12 and in the continued existence of the
practice despite the common law rule to the contrary. In line
with the arguments advanced above, the U. C. C., Section
2-205 provides: "An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods
in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that
it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration,
during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable
time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed
three months; but any such term of assurance on a form s'up-
plied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror."
This section modifies the common law rule only as to offers
made in writing by merchants to buy or sell goods.13  The
original common law rule of revocability applies in all other
cases. The rule is carefully stated to guard against surprise
when the form is supplied by the offeree. Such a clause must
11. This would be possible if the offer was unilateral, calling for per-
formance of acts involving time and expense as the means of acceptance.
See Abbott v. Stephany Poultry Co., 62 A.2d 243 (Del. 1948).
'If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the con-
sideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in
response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract. Restatement,
Contracts § 45 (1932).
12. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1941, ch. 328 (to be repealed when U.C.C. becomes
effective, Sept. 27, 1964).
A comparable result would obtain under the Uniform Written Obli-
gations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 33 § 6 (1927). That Act, adopted only by the
state of Pennsylvania, requires a statement that the signer of a writing
intends to be legally bound. It had none of the restrictions contained in
the N.Y. statute cited above, but it was not enacted to deal with the firm
offer problem as such.
13. In this respect, the New York statute cited in note 12 differs ma-
terially. It applies equally to all contracts in writing. It may state any
time period, but otherwise remains open for a reasonable time.
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be separately signed by the offeror and thus must be drawn
to his attention before he signs the order form. The Code
differs from other statutes which encompass the principle.
The section is not intended to displace present rules governing
long term options.14
The one thing that may import uncertainty into the law is
raised by the word "merchant." The definition of merchant
in the code is intended to indicate a professional status.15
This professional status may' arise from specialized know-
ledge as to goods, specialized knowledge as to business prac-
tices, or both. Thus, a university, maintaining a purchas-
ing department staffed with experts familiar with ordering
goods and capable of doing all acts necessary to complete an
offer, might properly be deemed a merchant. On the other
hand, the same purchasing agent, ordering goods for his own
home, might not be a merchant. The rule only applies to a
merchant when acting in that capacity.
This section represents a clear gain. It carries forward
the idea that law is a tool that should not hamper progress,
but rather enable men to carry out their desires in ways that
do not injure others. It is doubtful that society will suffer
because the firm offer is limited to contracts made by mer-
chants. It is equally doubtful that society would benefit by
extending the principle to all contracts.1 6
THE ACCEPTANCE
Historically, certain basic principles have governed ac-
ceptance of offers. First, an acceptance must be of the exact
terms offered-otherwise the attempted acceptance is a coun-
ter-offer and a rejection of the original offer.1 7 Second, the
14. The Uniform Written Obligation Act would seem to apply to op-
tions of any kind. Supra note 13.
15. U.C.C. § 2-104;
"(L) 'Merchant' means a person who deals in goods of the kind
or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge of
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
(3) 'Between merchants' means in any transaction with respect
to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of mer-
chants."
16. Corbin, however, feels that if this is a good rule for merchants
there is no good reason why it should not be universal in its applica-
tion. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, 119, n. 21 (1950).
17. Pollak v. Roberts, 45 N.D. 150, 176 N.W. 957 (1920).
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offeror controls the terms of the offer and has the power to
determine what precise acts shall constitute acceptance. 18
Third, when the offeror made an offer by post without
specifying the mode of acceptance, early decisions sensibly
assumed that an answer by post was impliedly called for-
the contract being completed upon proper posting of the letter
containing the acceptance.' 9 This view prevailed although the
answer was lost in the mail.20 However, when a later case in-
volved delivery of a written offer to the offeree while the
parties were face to face, which the offeror understood would
be considered by the offeree upon returning to his home in
another city, the original rule was stretched to cover the
new facts.21 The court stating: "Where the circumstances
are such that it must have been within the contemplation of
the parties that, according to the ordinary usages of mankind,
the post might be used as a means of communicating the ac-
ceptance of an offer, the acceptance is complete as soon as it
is posted. ' ' 22
This concept suggests that an offer made by ordinary post
might be accepted by wire, or by use of air-mail, or by any
means that might be commercially reasonable under particular
circumstances. In fact our own code contains a general state-
ment of this nature; 23 but none-the-less one might question
whether a wire sent in reply to an offer delivered in person
would constitute an acceptance until delivery. Certainly there
is authority that it would not.24
However, the problem of acceptance of offers is compli-
cated by the distinction between unilateral and bilateral con-
18. Ackerman v. Maddux, 26" N.D. 50, 143 N.W. 147 (1913); CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 56 (1950).
19. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 83 (3d ed. Jaeger, 1057); Restatement,
Contracts § 66 (1932).
20. Household Fire & Carriage Acc. Ins. Co., Limited v. Grant, 4 Ex.
D. 216 (1879).
21. Henthorn v. Fraser, (1892) 2 Ch. 27.
22. Id. at 27, 33.
23. N.D. Cent. Code § 9-03-18 (1961). "Mode of Communication of Ac-
ceptance. If a proposal prescribes any conditions concerning the communi-
cation of its acceptance, the proposer is not bound unless they are con-
formed to. In other cases any reasonable and usual mode may be adopted."
24. If the basis for the rule, that posting a letter of acceptance creates
a contract, Is that this mode of communication has been authorized by
the offeror by making the offer by mail, it is always arguable that use
of a different mode of communication creates a contract only If actually
communicated while the offer was still open. Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F.2d 415
(1st Cir. 1929). Where the offer Is delivered in person, even more doubt
exists as to the result. See, Elkhorn-Hazard Coal Co. v. Kentucky River
Corporation, 20 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1927); Scottish Am. Mtg. Co. v. Davis, 96
Tex. 504, 74 S.W. 17 (1903).
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tracts. If the contract was clearly unilateral, an attempted
acceptance by notice was wholly ineffective. It was not what
the offeror had requested as acceptance. No contract would
result until the very act bargained for had been completely
performed.2 5  The picture is further complicated in cases
where performance of the requested acts had begun, and the
offer was then withdrawn by the offeror. As a strict common
law proposition, the offer was not accepted until the com-
plete act or acts requested had been performed.26 Fortunate-
ly, where acceptance required acts which called for expendi-
ture of time and expense in their performance, the courts
saw fit to modify this rule on one theory or another;27 but in
general the fundamental distinction between unilateral and
bilateral contracts was preserved by the decisions.
Now comes the Code with some startling modification of
these classic rules of the past. So far as commercial trans-
actions are concerned it will no longer be true that an accept-
ance must coincide precisely with the terms of the offer. To
that degree the offeror will have lost some of his control
over the terms of the offer. Furthermore, the mode of ac-
cepting an offer made through an intermediary becomes that
which is commercially reasonable. And finally the former
clear distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts
will have lost some of its authority. The lawyer trained in
the common law may well ask, how can this be true? What
is the justification for such changes in the law?
U. C. C. § 2-206 provides:
"(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the
language or circumstances.
25. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 73A (3d ed., Jaeger, 1957).
26. Id. at § 60A.
27. Some cases seem to imply that the offeree by commencing per-
formance requested in a unilateral offer impliedly promises that he will
complete it. The contract is then treated as bilateral. Los Angeles Traction
Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1068 (1902); Wright v. Mary Galloway
Home for Aged Women, 186 Miss. 197 So. 752 (1939). The Restatement of
Contracts avoids this result by providing:
"If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the con-
sideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in
response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate
performance of which is conditional on the full consideration being given
or tendered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated,
Within a reasonable time." Restatement, Contracts § 45 (1932). Under the
Restatement, the offeree is not bound to complete performance. The of-
feror is estopped from revoking because it is unfair that he should do so.
See Hutchinson v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., Inc., 31 Tenn. App. 490,
217 S.W.2d 6 (1946). A third possibility is that courts favor bilateral over
1963]
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(a) An offer to make a contract shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any
medium reasonable in the circumstances. .. "
In view of our own code provision this section seems reason-
able and clear. Its undoubted purpose, for example, is to
repudiate decisions requiring that an offer made by mail be
accepted by mail to bring into operation the rule that putting
an answer in the course of communication completes the con-
tract. The language of this section clearly contemplates that
new media of communication may develop and be absorbed
into commercial practice. The old argument that. since the
acceptor used an unauthorized mode to communicate his
answer, he bears the risk of delay or of non-delivery, will be
rejected unless the offeror clearly indicates that any other
medium of communication will be unacceptable. Again, in
view of our own code provision, future extension of the rule
to all contracts is a result to be anticipated.
U. C. C. § 2-206 (1) (b) provides:
"(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the
language or circumstances
(2) an order or offer to buy goods for prompt or current
shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by
a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current ship-
ment of conforming or non-conforming goods, but such a ship-
ment of non-conforming goods does not constitute an ac-
ceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the
shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer."
I
The problem presented by this subsection involves another
application of the distinction between unilateral and bilateral
contracts. Is it possible for the offeree to treat an offer
phrased as calling for notice of acceptance as a unilateral
proposition to be accepted by doing the requested act? Or
to state the converse, could the offeree accept by giving notice
where the original offer calls for performance as the mode of
unilateral contracts. Where it is possible to do so the offer will be con-




acceptance? If either of these propositions is true there is
an entering wedge for a rule such as that proposed by this
section based purely on logic.
To illustrate: assume that B offers to buy described goods
from S, if S within one week will promise to ship the goods
to B by the end of the month. Without giving notice to B,
S ships the goods. Assuming that the goods will arrive with-
in the time limited for notice of acceptance, should B be en-
titled to reject them upon arrival at destination? He has
received better performance than anticipated. Can we then
conclude that a contract has been reached, although the origi-
nal offer called for notice of acceptance? Such an exception
to the general rule has been proposed in the Restatement of
Contracts."
To illustrate the converse of this situation assume that B
offers to buy described goods from S for immediate ship-
ment. S notifies B that the goods will be shipped at once. Is
B bound to accept delivery? If the offer is unilateral-if it
must be construed as calling for an act-shipment of the
goods-notice amounts to no more than an authentication
that the offer has been received.
It is certainly true that cases exist where the words "I
accept" cannot create a contract. Thus, where S offers to
furnish all the described goods which B may wish to order at
an agreed price over a period of time, B's statement that he
accepts, binds no one. The offer called for orders specify-
ing definite amounts of goods, nothing short of this will
suffice.29
But is it reasonable to construe the words "immediate
shipment" as calling only for acceptance by act? Is it not
more reasonable to say that he has only suggested one ac-
ceptable way to create a contract. What B wants is the
goods. What he asks is, will you fill my order? Either
notice of acceptance or arrival of the goods should satisfy
28. .If an offer requests a promise from the offeree, and the offeree
without making the promise actually does or tenders what he was re.
quested to promise to do, there Is a contract, subject to the rule stated
In § 56, provided such performance is completed or tendered within the
time allowable for accepting by making a promise. A tender in such a
case operates as a promise to render complete performance." Restatement,
Contracts § 63 (1932).
29. Mowbray Pearson Co. v. Stanton Co., 109 Wash. 601, 187 Pac. 370,
190 Pac. 330 (1920).
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him. In the language of the U. C. C., B has invited accept-
ance either by prompt shipment or a promise to make such
a shipment.
The cases clearly support the view that shipment is an
effective acceptance, making it too late for the offeror to
revoke 0 Usually the courts find that the contract created
was unilateral, although this result is subject to question
where the goods carry warranties, express or implied.
Conversely, there is much authority supporting the view
that a letter of acceptance mailed by S completes the con-
tract 1  This of course, results in a bilateral contract, but
the courts see no difficulty, because of inconsistency, in reach-
ing this result. It is considered to be purely a question of
intention, the words "for immediate shipment" being con-
strued in the light of commercial usage and practice.
There remains for consideration, the matter of shipment of
non-conforming goods. This section of the Code suggests
that such a shipment in response to an order calling for
immediate shipment is an acceptance, and at the same time
a breach of contract may be involved.
Under existing law one might assume that a shipment of
non-conforming goods is clearly not an acceptance. Rather,
it would seem to be a counter-offer.3 2 If B removes the goods
from the cars-accepts delivery-has he not accepted the
new offer? It follows, if this view is accepted, that any
right to damages for failure to fill the original order is gone.
Of course, B might reject the goods because they do not con-
form. One cannot question his right to do so, but has the
seller any liability when this occurs?
Several possible reasons exist as to why non-conforming
goods were sent. The seller may believe that the goods do
in fact fit the specifications in the order. On the other hand,
he may have sent them with full knowledge that they do not
meet specifications. In the latter case his desire may be to
aid the buyer. From seller's point of view, where goods are
30. Petroleum Products Distributing Co. v. Alton Tank Line, 165 Iowa
398, 146 N.W. 52 (1914); National Cash Register Co. v. Dehn, 139 Mich. 406,
102 N.W. 965 (1905).
31. Bauman v. McManus, 75 Kan. 106, 89 Pac. 15 (1907); Doolittle v. Cal-
lender, 88 Neb. 747, 130 N.W. 436 (1911).




in short supply, this may be a real service to the buyer and
one the seller can reasonably anticipate buyer will expect.
To answer the questions raised above, consider the follow-
ing hypothetical cases:
Assume a shipment is found to be defective. Buyer takes
the position that seller has tendered these goods in perform-
ance of his (buyer's) order asking for "immediate ship-
ment." It follows that a breach has occurred for which the
seller is answerable in damages.
3 3
Buyer answers that the offer was unilateral. Since the
goods are non-conforming, shipment could not possibly oper-
ate as an acceptance. The tender was a counter-offer which
the buyer accepted by taking possession and exercising domin-
ion over the goods.
This has been termed "the unilateral contract trick,"3 4 and
the result has been sustained in a number of jurisdictions.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, however, this result
would be reversed. If seller wishes to tender goods as ac-
commodation to the buyer he may so state-but otherwise he
is estopped to deny that his shipment of non-conforming
goods was an acceptance of buyer's order.
Stating the alternative problem: buyer rejects the proffered
shipment because of defects; buyer has a right to treat the
shipment as a counter-offer, and after rejection has no
further obligations with regard to the goods unless they
are perishable in nature.36 In other words, he may forego a
right to damages. On the other hand, the Code, through
provision for "cover," gives the buyer a liberal measure for
recovery of damages sustained.
32T
Actually, the blurring of the distinction between bilateral
and unilateral contracts in this subsection is more apparent
than real. However, it would not be true in all cases that
shipment of non-conforming goods constituted not only an
acceptance, but also a breach. The U. C. C. permits curing
of a defective tender where the .time for performance has
33. Under U.C.C. § 2-508 the seller may cure a defective tender.
34. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 6. 7 (1958).
35. Lowry Coffee Co. v. Andresen-Ryan Coffee Co., 153 Minn. 498, 190
N.W. 985 (1922).
36. U.C.C. §§ 2-601, 2-603.
37. U.C.C. § 2-712.
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not yet expired and it is not too late to make a proper
conforming tender, or where seller had reasonable grounds
to believe the tender would be acceptable to buyer and re-
jection comes as a surprise to seller. The Code, in effect,
prevents buyer from treating a defective tender as an an-
ticipatory breach where such action on buyer's part would
not be commercially reasonable . 3
Taken as a whole, this subsection represents a restate-
ment of the better case law under the Sales Act. It covers
a problem chiefly prevalent in the sales field, but should
furnish a blueprint to be followed in any area of contracts.
II
U. C. C. § 2-206 (2) provides:
"Where the beginning of a requested performance is a
reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified
of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer
as having lapsed before acceptance."
Under existing law the great weight of authority supports
the view that beginning performance of acts requested in a
unilateral offer, with intent to accept, makes it too late for
the offeror to revoke the offer. 39 The question of notice to
the offeror of such commencement of performance has re-
ceived scant attention in the cases. One possible approach
is to assume that if notice was expected, the offeror should
have asked for it.4 ° In other cases the problem was solved
by the nature of the performance, the acts being such that
notice would come in due course to the offeror.41 Under our
law in North Dakota, acceptance of an offer to guaranty is
required,4 2 and this is true in other states under decisions that
may have confused notice as a required form of acceptance
of an offer with a requirement of a later notice as a con-
dition precedent to the surety's duty to make payment of
the debt.4 3 In any event, there would seem to be no reason
for distinguishing contracts of guaranty from any other type
of unilateral contract.
38. U.C.C. § 2-508.
39. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 63 (1950).
40. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 68 (3d ed., Jaeger, 1957).
41. This would be true in case of an order for goods to be packed and
shipped to the buyer.
42. N.D. Cent. Code § 22-01-06 (1961).
43. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 68 (1950).
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However, the rule under discussion here is based on estop-
pel, the courts did not consider notice to be an issue before
them. Unfortunately, since the contract is unilateral, the
offeree has the privilege of delaying further performance
until it appears to him that completion of performance will
be profitable. 44 True, if he delays too long, acceptance by
performance may be no longer possible. The important point
to note is that the offeror cannot elect to treat his acts in
beginning performance as an acceptance, and this despite the
fact that the offeree might have so intended. We must re-
member that the offeree has not promised to perform, nor
was he requested to indicate acceptance by giving notice of
intention to perform. We should note further that the
offeror may be totally unaware that acts requested by him
were in the process of performance by the offeror. The re-
sulting inequity as between offeror and offeree is obvious.
The offeree should have no right to hold the offeror bound
while he himself remains free to either complete or abandon
the contract.
The Code would repudiate this inequity between the parties.
The offeree, under the Code, must give notice within a rea-
sonable time or the offeror may treat the offer as having
lapsed. Notice is required to make the offer irrevocable.
Notice has another more limited effect. Since it is required
to make the offer irrevocable, the tendency of the offeree will
be to give it earlier than under present practices." Although
it is not an acceptance in the sense that it binds the offeree
to complete the contract, none-the-less, an offeree who has
already commenced performance will seldom find it to his
advantage to change his mind and abandon the contract.
Thus, the offeror now has knowledge that the offeree has
1
44. In Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086
(1902), we have a classic example of an extended delay in pushing to
completion a street railway. Holders of notes conditioned on its com-
pletion failed to secure cancellation thereof on the theory that a contract
originally unilateral had become bilateral upon the securing of a fran-
chise by the company.
45. Does notice to the offeror that performance has begun convert a
unilateral offer into bilateral contract? This would seem to be a pos-
sible construction of this section. However, subsection (1) (b) would not
apply since this is not an order calling for prompt or current shipment.
The language of subsection (2) would seem to envisage cases where the
goods are to be shipped at some indefinite time in the future. It clearly
applies where goods are ordered in the spring for fall shipment, or to be
manufactured and delivered when completed. Had the drafters intended
to abandon common law rules relating to unilateral contracts one might
assume they would have so stated.
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commenced performance, and some assurance that it will be
completed. Prior to notice the common law rule of estoppel
barring revocation by the offeror may still operate, because
it still remains true that where the offeror has induced the
offeree to commence performance it may be unfair to re-
voke the offer. In short, the Code attempts to remove the
inequity that exists between the parties by cutting down the
time within which the offeree may delay in making his deci-
sion whether or not to complete performance.
This subsection is not open to the criticism that it converts
a unilateral into a bilateral contract. The common law rule
is retained with the one addition that notice be given. The
rule otherwise is consistent with the common law rules gov-
erning unilateral offers. There is no sound reason why this
rule should not be extended to the whole contract area.
III
U. C. C. § 2-207 provides:
"(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance
or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable
time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms.
"(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals
for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms
become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of
the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received.
"(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract
for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
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contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms in-
corporated under any other provisions of this Act."
The problem raised in this section fell within the ambit of
the common law rule that acceptance of an offer must be un-
conditional. 4 6  The offeror was considered master of the
power of acceptance he chose to confer on the offeree. Un-
fortunately, business men, perhaps unaware that such a rule
existed, have adopted practices that seemingly disregard the
rule. Thus, in closing a deal by wire or by correspondence it
is not uncommon to add terms, which may or may not be
suggestions for additions to the offer and which the sender
considers to be reasonable under the circumstances, such as
"ship at once," "rush," "ship draft against bill of lading,
inspection allowed," etc.4 7
Where deals have been concluded orally it is customary for
merchants to confirm in writing. The larger business entity
may use forms prepared by counsel which are printed up in
large blocks. Frequently these forms contain printed condi-
tions considered by counsel to be necessary for the protection
of a client extensively engaged in purchase or sale of goods.
If both buyer and seller confirm on printed forms containing
conflicting conditions trouble results in case of litigation. Of
course in the normal case, both parties consider themselves
bound by contract if the order specifications are satisfactory
to both. Both parties are concerned with performance, not
breach of the contract. Both consider breach only as a re-
mote contingency which counsel has already guarded against
through selected clauses inserted in the respective forms.
However, if either party seeks to repudiate the agreement it
must then be decided whether a meeting of the minds had
occurred. In the case of confirmation by letter or telegram
it is possible to argue that the new terms are mere suggestions
and not conditions qualifying the acceptance. But this argu-
ment will not stand in the case of a printed form expressly
made conditional on compliance with its terms.
The problem is illustrated by a New York case in which
46. Pollak v. Roberts, 45 N.D. 150, 176 N.W. 957 (1920).
47. The illustrations are taken from the Comments. For a North Da-
kota case in accord see: Horgan v. Russell, 24 N.D. 490, 140 N.W. 99 (1913).
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buyer and seller had agreed by telephone for sale and pur-
chase of dyes. 48  Buyer sent seller a purchase order which
stated on its face, "kindly sign and return," and on the re-
verse side, certain conditions which included a provision for
arbitration. Seller did not sign or return the purchase order,
but instead sent its own memoranda of sale to the buyer. A
dispute having arisen over the quality of the dye, a demand
for arbitration was made by buyer which seller refused, con-
tending it had never agreed to the arbitration clause. In
this case it was possible for the court to hold that the buyer's
purchase order was merely an offer, or a counter-offer which
had never been accepted by the seller. Its retention by the
seller was not an acceptance through silence because the
seller had no duty to speak in the absence of a course of pre-
vious dealings or other factors that might have raised such
a duty. Since the buyer accepted the goods under the terms
of the seller's memoranda of sale, buyer cannot now contend
he was not bound by the terms of the agreement as so stated.
If we vary the above facts by having buyer and seller ex-
change forms to confirm the oral agreement, the forms con-
taining conflicting conditions purporting to be a part of the
stated contract, no contract would result if the parties clearly
intended that confirmation in writing should be a condition
precedent. Yet it is obvious that both parties assumed other-
wise. Seller shipped, and buyer accepted a tender of the goods
and would have paid in full but for the alleged breach.
Under another possible view of the above facts the problems
of silence as acceptance might become an issue. If the parties
considered that the contract was consummated by the oral
agreement, and in sending confirmatory memoranda assumed
they were restating the terms of that oral agreement, addi-
tional terms would be suggestions for additions to the con-
tract. Each party by retaining the memo without objection
might be thought to have accepted the other's proposals.
Assent by silence would not occur, however, where the con-
ditions were in direct conflict, nor where they would substan-
tially differ from the contract the other party thought he was
entering into. In any event, silence is acceptance only where
48. Albrecht Chemical Co. v. Anderson Trading Corporation, 298 N.Y.
437, 84 N.X.2d 625 (1949).
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a duty to speak would arise from prior course of dealing. The
difficulties which would arise from adopting the view that
silence in consent are such that in all probability courts would
reject it out of hand.
Finally, if buyer uses his own standard form, to order
goods from seller and seller accepts on his own standard form
no contract results under present law if seller's acceptance
contains conditions which make it a counter-offer.
The cases posed above suggest that the technical common
law rules governing offer and acceptance all too frequently
are used to avoid deals for reasons not dictated by commercial
good faith. The Code view is that if the deal has proceeded
to the point where the average merchant would consider him-
self bound, a contract has in fact been made although the
writings do not agree on all points.49 Thus, the fact that
goods ordered are actually shipped on the assumption that
a binding contract had been entered into satisfied the Code
requirements for formation of a contract.
IV
Under the Code all sales to consumers will be governed by
the rule that additional terms in an acceptance not made ex-
pressly conditional will be treated as suggestions. 50 Where
the seller uses a standard form with printed express condi-
tions it would still remain true that buyer must reject the
goods or be held to have accepted the counteroffer.51 His
only protection in such a case would be to plead that he had
no notice because the conditions were not clearly made con-
ditional or were in small print that was not drawn to his
attention. This would seem to remain true although the
Code no longer requires the precision in offer and acceptance
that existed under pre-code rules. In the language of the
Code: "Conduct by both parties which recognizes the exis-
49. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) provides: "A contract for sale of goods may be
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement..."
U.C.C. § 2-207(3) set out in the text, saupra, implements the above
section. Comment 2 states: ". . . a proposed deal which in commercial
understanding has in fact been closed is recognized as a contract."
50. Cf. Restatement, Contracts, § 62 (1932): "An acceptance which re-
quests a change or addition to the terms of the offer is not thereby in-
validated unless the acceptance is made to depend on assent to the chang-
ed or added terms." And see N.Dak. Cent. Code § 9-03-21 (1961).
51. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. D. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (lst Cir. 1962).
52. Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
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tence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for
sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract. ' '1. 3 On the other hand, where the terms
are not made expressly conditional, a consumer is not bound
by subsection two. He need not express objection to the
additional terms, but may simply disregard them. The only
difficulty here is in determining when additional terms have
been made expressly conditional. The Code seems to furn-
ish a specific answer: ".... unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional of different terms. ' ' 54
Merely stating the additional term would not seem sufficient
to meet this requirement.
As between merchants the code is intended to alleviate the
harshness of the rule that requires exact compliance with
the terms of the offer. Assuming that merchants ordinarily
consider themselves not bound until an oral agreement is
confirmed in writing, the provisions of subsection two apply
to the form supplied by the offeree, which contains terms
additional to those contained in the offeror's form. Despite
this failure to meet the conditions of the offer, offeree under
the Code, if he has not changed the order specifications re-
lating to the description of the goods, has made a seasonable
and prompt acceptance.
Under the Code, additional terms contained in the accept-
ance form become part of the contract unless (1) the offer
expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; or (2)
they materially alter it; or (3) notification of objection to
them has already been given or is given within a reasonable
time after notice of them is received.
On careful consideration it would appear that the Code
does not abrogate the principle that an offeror controls the
terms of his offer-rather the emphasis has been changed.
In recognition of the fact that merchants frequently conclude
deals in skeleton form, adding additional terms in confirm-
atory memoranda is an expected procedure. The obliga-
tion of good faith imposed by the Code makes it reasonable
to require that the offeror notify the offeree of his objections
to any additional term of which he disapproves. On the other
53. U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
54. U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
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hand, the Code continues to recognize that the offeror may
insist on acceptance of the very terms submitted. To do so,
however, he must expressly state that such is his intention.
When additional terms materially alter the original offer,
or oral agreement reached by the parties, a more difficult
problem is posed. The answer is suggested in part in sub-
section three: "The terms of a contract consist of those terms
on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions
of this Act."' 5  This suggests that where the terms are in
fact in conflict they are necessarily material and do not
become part of the contract whether or not the offeror objects
to their inclusion. A recent decision in Massachusetts fed-
eral court suggests that this analysis may not stand.56 A user
of cellophane bags ordered a cellophane adhesive from a manu-
facturer, specifying "End use: wet pack spinach bags." D re-
turned an acceptance form which bore in conspicious type
the statement: "All goods sold without warranties, express
or implied, and subject to the terms on reverse side." On the
reverse side appeared the statement: "if these terms are not
acceptable, Buyer must so notify Seller at once." It was ad-
mitted that buyer did not give notice of objection, but accept-
ed and used the emulsion. The emulsion failed to adhere
properly and buyer instituted suit for damages against seller.
Applying the language of subsection three, it would appear
that buyer's offer raised an implication that the emulsion
would be merchantable and reasonably fit for the purpose
disclosed to seller 7 By disclaiming all warranties the offeree
has materially changed the offer5s While the Code does lead
us to hold that a contract was reached-buyer did accept and
use the goods--can the buyer safely disregard seller's re-
quest that notice of objection be given unless buyer wishes
to agree to the new conditions? The obligation of good faith
imposed by the code would seem to apply to this situation5 9
55. U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
56. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. D. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (Mass. 1962).
57. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
58. Statements in the Comment Indicate that the drafters feel that an
exclusion of the usual warranties would be material within the meaning
of this section.
59. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b): "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means
honest in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade."
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Was not what the seller said: "notify me if you do not agree"
equivalent to: "I will not accept your offer unless you agree
to the following additional condition?"
While the court did not mention the obligation of good
faith, which the writer feels was relevant here, it does sug-
gest that the buyer cannot sit back and assume that the seller
has given him an unlimited right to let the new term die for
lack of an acceptance. The seller has stated the opposite,
and it is the buyer's duty to examine the terms of the ac-
ceptance. Have we now gone the whole round and come
back to the original common law view that seller's proposition
was a rejection and a counter-offer?
It is too early to predict whether the view adopted by the
Massachusetts case will prevail. It must be admitted that
the argument advance by the court seems sound, at least
where the offeree has asked for notice of objection to an addi-
tional term which he insists upon. On the other hand, the
writer sees no reason why the statute should not apply as
drafted where no notice of objection to additional terms was
called for. Although this section is meritorious in that it
carries forward the initial purpose of the drafters to alleviate
the hardship and unfairness that result under pre-code rules
governing offer and acceptance, the foregoing discussion
would seem to indicate that further study should be made as
to possible fact situations which might arise causing the sec-
tion to operate unfairly. Rather than building up a body of
exceptions to the section, amendments should be drafted to
take care of these meritorious fact situations.
Up to this point, we have considered matters relating to
formation of the contract-matters relating to offer and ac-
ceptance. There remains for consideration those sections of
the code relating to construction, operation, and validity of
certain clauses in sales contracts. The length of this paper
prevents more than a cursory treatment of the remaining
sections.
U. C. C. § 1-201 (3) defines "agreement" . . . . as "the
bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or
by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance. . ..
Whether an agreement has legal consequences is determined
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by the provisions of this Act, if applicable, otherwise by the
law of contracts .... ,60 Implementing this section, U. C. C.
§ 1-205 defines these terms and makes some important
changes in the law. The Code substitutes for the present
requirement of universality, to establish a trade usage, "reg-
ularity of observance." Any contention that a custom or
usage cannot be used to displace an established rule of law
is rejected. 61 Commercial agreement are to be read in the
light of trade practices whenever expectations that such
practices will be observed with respect to particular trans-
actions are justified under the facts. To prevent abuse, evi-
dence of a relevant usage-of trade is not admissible until the
other party to the suit is given notice sufficient to prevent
surprise. On the other hand, commercial acceptance makes
out a prima facie case of reasonableness, and the burden is on
the other party to establish that the usage is not reasonable.
U. C. C. § 2-202 states the parol evidence rule in modern
form. It would reject any assumption that because some
items in the agreement have been finalized it includes all
matters treated therein; or that rules of construction bar
proof of meaning peculiar to the commercial context in which
a word is used; or that judicial determination of ambiguity
is a condition precedent to proof of course of dealing, usage
of trade, or course of performance. 62
Rounding out this picture, U. C. C. § 2-208 emphasizes the
importance of course of performance in determining the
meaning of the parties. Under the Code a course of perform-
ance is always relevant to determine the meaning of the
60. u.c.c. § 1-103 provides:
"Unless displaced by the particular provision of this Act, the princi-
ples of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepreselita-
tion, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating cause shall
supplement its provisions." For a similar clause see N.D. Cent. Code §
51-01-73 (1961).
61. Mandatory rules of law such as the Statute of Frauds (U.C.C. §
2-201) will not be displaced.
62. U.C.C. § 2-202 provides:
"Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any
prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be ex-
plained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or
by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and ex-
clusive statement of the terms of the agreement."
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agreement. 6 3  On the other hand, acquiesence in course of
performance is equally consistent with waiver or modifica-
tion of contract terms. The Code favors waiver because it
may be retracted where no substantial change of circum-
stances has occurred, 64 and thus makes provision for cases of
hardship and surprise.
U. C. C. § 2-209 deals specifically with the problem of modi-
fication of a sales contract. In effect it will abolish the rule
that a promise to do what one is already legally obligated to
do, but for an increase or decrease in the original considera-
tion, is not a valid contract. Courts have long sought to
evade the rule. In our own state we have modified it by
statute.6 5 But the Code goes further. Even an oral modifica-
tion needs no consideration to be valid. As a hedge against
over-reaching and fraud, the Code requires that merchants
observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing".
in addition the contract may exclude modification except by
a signed writing, and if the contract is in writing and within
the statute of frauds, the requirements of the statute must
be satisfied.
The code sections on construction, modification and waiver
do not represent a radical departure from rules of the past.
All the Code has attempted is to establish guide lines that will
help to avoid pit falls and uncertainties that existed under
prior case law. Broadening the scope of custom as a factor
in construction of sales agreements is a frank recognition
63. Evidence of course of performance was considered relevant in
Bronson -Chambers, 51 N.D. 737, 200 N.W. 906 (1924); in accord see,
Battagler v. Dickson, 38 N.W.2d 720 (N.D. 1949).
64. U.C.C. § 2-209(5) provides:
"A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion
of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received
by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver."
Cf. N.D. Cent. Code § 9-12-18 (1961).
"The creditor must make objections to the mode of an offer of
perfotmance at the time it is made to him. If this is not done, any ob-
jection which could have been obviated at that time is waived by his fail-
ure to make the same.
65. N.D. Cent. Code § 9-09-05 (1961) provides:
"A contract not In writing may be altered in any respect by consent
of the parties in writing without a new consideration, or by oral 'consent
of the parties with a new consideration, and is extinguished thereby to
the extent of the alteration."
N.D. Cent. Code § 9-09-06 (1961) provides:
"A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing or
by an executed oral agreement and not otherwise. An oral agreement is
executed within the meaning of this section whenever the party perform-
ing has incurred a detriment which he was not obligated by the original
contract to incur."
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that such agreements are seldom intended to be completely
integrated. And the treatment of course of performance rec-
ognizes that exigencies of trade are the cause of frequent
concessions in performance of sales contracts. The shift of
emphasis from the presumed intent of the parties at the time
of making of the agreement to what the parties actually do in
carrying it out is a concession to realism." The parties know
best what they want to do. The business of the law is not
to defeat, but to implement that intent, with proper safe-
guards against over reaching and fraud. One thing is certain,
the code sections will give much more satisfaction to the law-
yer who seeks to establish a custom or a course of performance
than was true in the past.
U. C. C. § 2-210 deals with assignment of rights and delega-
tion of duties. The Code makes no attempt to restate the law
in its entirety. Rather, its purpose is to clear up certain basic
concepts developed in case law in a rather unsatisfactory
manner.
The Code makes no substantial change in present law. On
the other hand the intent is to substantially limit the reasons
that may be advanced for opposing assignment of rights or
delegation of duties.6 7  Thus, a prohibition of assignment
of "the contract" is to be construed as referring only to dele-
gation of duties,63 unless circumstances indicate the contrary.
While parties may contract against any assignment of rights
while the contract is executory, any right to damages for
breach of contract or a right arising from completion of per-
formance cannot be restricted by such a clause. 69 This accords
with our law.v0
Output, requirements, and exclusive dealing contracts illus-
trate the type of case where assignment of rights usually
accompanied with delegation of duties, have been found objec-
66. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) provides:
"The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as con-
si-stent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable ex-
press terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade and course
of dealing controls usage of trade."
67. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, 14-16 (1958).
68. U.C.C. § 2-210(3).
69. U.C.C. § 2-110(2).
70. Dixon-Reo Co. v. Horton Motor Co., 49 N.D. 304. 191 N.W. 780 (1922).
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tionable by the courts. 71 The tendency, right or wrong, was
to hold that the assignee had such a wide discretion to either
expand or contract his demands, that the burden on the obli-
gee might become intolerable.
In treating of output, requirements and exclusive dealing
cases the Code has removed the element of discretion by
substituting objective tests.7 2  Under the Code the output or
requirements of a particular business are related to such
output or requirements as may occur in good faith, and if an
estimate has been stated, no quantity unreasonably dispro-
portionate thereto is within the scope of the agreement. If
no estimate has been made, the test is any normal or com-
parable prior output or requirement.7
3
Recognizing that the other party to the contract trusted
to the credit or the integrity of the assignee and hence has a
right to look askance at a delegation of contractual duties to
a third party, the Code gives him the right to demand assur-
ance that such performance will be forthcoming. This right
is in addition to the surety relation created by the assignment
and delegation of duties. Unless such assurance in writing
is given within 30 days, the contract may be rescinded; pend-
ing assurance, performance may be suspended. 4
This section restores full vitality to assignment and dele-
gation of duties. It recognizes that the norm is free assign-
ability. It safeguards the non-assigning party by giving him
a new right to demand assurance from the assignee that the
delegatee will perform. It clears up any danger that a nova-
tion has resulted in discharge of the assignee.
This survey of Code sections dealing with contracts will
close with consideration of sections bearing on uncertainty in
terms of the doctrine of mutuality.
The position adopted in the Code is forcefully stated in the
section dealing with formation of the contract:7 5 "Even
though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
71. Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co., 147 Md.
588, 128 ATL. 280, 39 A.L.R. 1184 (1925).
72. See HAWKLAND, op. eit supra note 67, at 15. The right to ask
for adequate assurance for performance from the delegate reduces the
degree of interest the promisee may have in demanding that the dele-
gator perform in person.
73. U.C.C. § 2-306.
74. U.C.C. § 2-609.
75. U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
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does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy."
Implementing this section, U. C. C. § 2-304 permits merch-
ants to adopt open price clauses that would be objectionable
as a matter of common law. Thus, an agreement leaving price
to be determined at a later date is now to be enforceable on
the basis of a reasonable price. It will no longer be true that
where a standard for ascertaining price becomes inoperable
the contract will fail. The reasonable price standard again
is applicable. The most important change here, as noted in
considering previous sections, is a change in the approach to
the problem raised by indefiniteness. Since the Code has a
standard of commercial good faith, it will no longer be true
that where either the seller or the buyer has the option of
setting a price he may set an unreasonable price. This as-
sumed right has in the past led to holdings that the contract
is unenforceable.76 The Code approach is more sensible. Leav-
ing such a power to either party means a price for that party
to, fix in good faith, and if he fails to act the other party at
his option may treat the contract as at an end or himself fix
a reasonable price. On the other hand, it is still a question
of fact whether the parties intend to be bound prior to fixing
of the price.
This section of the Code illustrates a situation in which
the courts will be able to write a new contract for the parties.
Or to put the matter differently, every person entering a price
fixing contract assumed to contract on the basis of a reason-
able price unless he contracts for a specific price or states
that he does not choose to be bound until a price is determined
between the parties.
More to the point, this section will make a flexible price
arrangement possible where the deal involves unknown and
unascertainable costs, development of new products, or other
factors that make ascertainment of the price at the time of
drafting the contract highly impractical. The net effect of
the section is to greatly limit the indefiniteness rule, and
76. Cases In harmony with the Code approach are: Mantell v. Inter-
national Plastic Harmonica Corp., 141 N.J. Eq. 379, 55 A.2d 250 (1947);
Taller & Cooper v. Illuminating Electric Co., 172 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1949).
77. 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634, 106 A.L.R. 1274 (1936).
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strike down in this area the rule that an agreement to agree
does not result in a binding contract.
Two cases illustrate the problems treated in U. C. C. § 2-311.
In Wilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, contracted buyer in
writing to purchase 11,500 gallons of lubricating oil, to be
shipped seven months later. The amount of each brand to
be purchased was fixed, but buyer had the option of taking
as many gallons of each weight of a certain brand as he saw
fit at quoted prices. Held, the contract was too indefinite to
be enforced.7 8
In Mitsubishi Boshi Kaiska v J. Aron & Co., Inc.,79 six
cars of oil, to be delivered two cars a month, were sold to
buyer with the right in buyer to give shipping instructions
on the first day of each month. Buyer having failed to give
shipping instructions for the last installment, seller started
the cars rolling cross country and continued to press for in-
structions. Held, tender of shipping documents to buyer did
not constitute performance by seller where the cars had pro-
ceeded too far to permit diversion by buyer.
U. C. C. § 2-311 lays down guide lines that would have aided
in the solutipn of the two cases cited. First, under the Code,
a contract is not too indefinite nor does it lack mutuality
because it leaves particulars of performance to one of the
parties. In the language of the Code: "Any such specification
must be made in good faith and within limits set by commer-
cial reasonableness." Under the Code, specifications relat-
ing to the goods, unless otherwise agreed, are at buyer's
option, and specifications relating to shipment rest with the
seller.
Thus, the Code would have saved the contract in the Bratt-
rude case, and in the Mitsubishi case, the plaintiff Would have
been excused for any delay in his own performance but
would have had the right to tender performance in any rea-
sonable manner. He would have had the further right to
treat failure to specify shipment terms as a breach by failure
to deliver or accept goods. The importance of the Code here
78. Contra, Fairmount Glass Works v. Cruden Marin Woodenware Co.,
106 Ky. 659, 51 S.W. 196 (1899).
79. 16 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1926).
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is that it spells out the plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff need no
longer search the cases for authorities in point.
To summarize, the Code would repudiate those cases that
over stress definiteness and mutuality to strike down agree-
ments which merchants have found to be commercially useful.
No one quarrels with a reasonable application of the doctrine
of mutuality, nor with the requirement of definiteness- but
to strike down an agreement that contains standards by means
of which performance in the future can be measured unduly
hampers commercial transactions. The Code does not abolish
the requirement of mutuality, that unless plaintiff is bound
defendant should not be bound. It does refuse to require
that the obligations undertaken on each side be weighed to
determine whether the requirements of mutuality have been
met. On the other hand, the Code has built in safety factors
that justify departure from the case law of the past. These
factors have been considered in context in the foregoing
pages of this Article, but" one additional safety factor should
be considered in closing.
U. C. C. § 2-302 provides:
"(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the
time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the con-
tract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract with-
out the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the applica-
tion of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscion-
able result.
"(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be .unconscionable the
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to pre-
sent evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination."
Here for the first time, a-court is given statutory authority
to exercise a power it may have already had. Certainly it is
true that many instances exist where courts have avoided
unjust results through application of rules of construction in
rather strained ways or have applied public policy concepts
to strike down a particular clause or an entire contract. This
1963]
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section is an improvement on the past, it makes direct polic-
ing of the contract honest and respectable. 80
80. Unconsionable clauses in sales contracts led to enactment of N.D.
Cent. Code § 51-07-07 (allowing reasonable time for the testing of trac-
tors, harvesting and threshing machinery). Smith v. Oscar M. Wills &
Co., 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 129 (1920) neatly illustrates a strained construc-
tion of sales law to avoid injustice. A sale by description of alfalfa seed
would give rise to an implied warranty under the sales act. Despite a dis-
claimer clause the court found a breach of contract resulted when sweet
clover was delivered through mistake. Compare: Deere & W. Co. v. Moch,
71 N.D. 649, 3 N.W.2d 471, 139 A.L.R. 1270 (1942).
